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Abstract:
Financing terms and investment decisions are jointly determined. This interdependence,
which links firms’ asset and liability sides, can lead to short-termism in investment. In our
model, financing frictions increase with the investment horizon, such that financing for long-
term projects is relatively expensive and potentially rationed. In response, firms whose first-
best investments are long-term may adopt second-best projects of shorter maturities. This
worsens financing terms for firms with shorter maturity projects, inducing them to change
their investments as well. In equilibrium, investment is inefficiently short-term. Equilibrium
asset-side adjustments by firms can amplify shocks and, while privately optimal, can be
socially undesirable.
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1. Introduction
Financing terms affect investment decisions and investment decisions affect financing
terms. This interdependence creates an intimate link between firms’ asset and liability sides.
In particular, when financing for long-term projects is relatively expensive or impossible,
firms may adjust their investment behavior towards shorter-term projects, even when those
are less efficient.
In this paper we develop an integrated equilibrium framework to study how financing fric-
tions that arise on the liability side affect investments on firms’ asset sides, and vice versa. In
our model, contracting frictions due to limited commitment are more pronounced at longer
horizons, which leads to less attractive funding terms and, ultimately, credit rationing for
long-term investment projects. Firms with long-term investment opportunities respond by
adjusting their asset-side investments towards alternative, shorter-maturity projects, even if
those projects are second best. The central result of our paper is that these asset-side adjust-
ments are self-reinforcing: An individual firm’s asset-side decision endogenously determines
the financing terms faced by other firms, thereby influencing their investment decision—
creating an externality. In the presence of this externality, the competitive equilibrium
exhibits inefficient “collective” short-termism in real investment relative to the constrained
optimum.
Consider a firm that seeks funding for the development of a new product that requires sub-
stantial investment in long-term research and development (R&D). While the development
of this innovative product may be efficient from a net present value (NPV) perspective, the
uncertainty associated with the required long-term R&D can make financing such a project
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difficult. The firm may therefore choose to develop a product that builds on an existing
technology and can be brought to market more quickly, even if that product is inferior. Or
consider a mining company seeking to fund a long-term exploration project, such as the
development of an oil sand.1 The riskiness of long-term exploration makes financing such a
project difficult. The mining company may therefore forego the long-term project and settle
for a shorter-term investment, for example, the development of a shale gas well, even if this
is an inferior investment for this particular company.2 In both cases, the firm affects funding
terms for those firms that have efficient short-term projects, which may now be abandoned in
favor of even shorter-term investments. Or consider a financial institution in the aftermath
of the Lehman default. Increased uncertainty about the quality of banks made financing for
long-term investments hard to come by,3 thereby pushing financial institutions with good
long-term investments into less profitable shorter-term investments.4 However, through this
adjustment also shorter-term financing to banks becomes riskier, thereby encouraging other
banks to shorten their assets and liabilities as well. The common thread in these examples
is that privately optimal asset-side adjustments lead to a cross-firm externality.
In our model, firms are born with first-best investment projects of different maturities.
Some firms have safe projects, while others have risky projects whose risk, a mean-preserving
1Oil sand projects require large up-front investments in well pads or mines and are therefore long-term
projects.
2Shale gas properties, on the other hand, tend to produce out in a few years and are thus shorter-term
projects.
3Krishnamurthy (2010) shows that maturities in the commercial paper market, a significant source of
funding for financial institutions, shortened significantly after the Lehman default. Kuo, Skeie, Vickery, and
Youle (2013) use FedWire data to show that a similar shortening of maturities occurred in the interbank
lending market, with a particularly sharp decline in the fraction of loans with a maturity of at least three
months.
4For example, a financial institution with a comparative advantage in making long-term loans may shift
its loan portfolio to shorter maturities, where it has less of an advantage. In addition, the shortening of the
financial institution’s loans may distort the real decisions of the firms funded through these loans.
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spread relative to safe projects, increases with the maturity of the project. The main friction
is a limited-commitment assumption in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart
and Moore (1994): While there is no ex ante information asymmetry on whether a project
is safe or risky, ex post successful firms with risky projects can always pretend to have had
a safe project and abscond with the difference in cash flow. Firms seek financing from a
financial sector that can observe the maturity of an investment project. Financing optimally
occurs via a debt contract and, in order for the financier to break even, the interest rate on
this debt contract has to increase with maturity in order to reflect the higher risk at longer
project horizons, leading to less attractive financing terms for long-term projects. Beyond a
certain maturity, the limited commitment friction is so severe that financiers cannot break
even, such that lending breaks down and maturity rationing arises.
Rationing of long-term projects generates the endogenous asset-side adjustments cen-
tral to this paper. Firms that cannot fund their (first-best) long-term projects react by
adopting second-best projects of shorter maturity, for which financing is available. This
maturity adjustment is unobservable to financiers and therefore creates endogenous asym-
metric information, because the inflow of second-best projects worsens the pool of funded,
shorter-maturity projects. This affects the terms of the debt contract offered by financiers
who now face a worse pool of borrowers, leading to a negative externality: Funding terms
for firms that up to now could receive financing worsen and, because the maximum funded
maturity shortens, a number of formerly fundable firms are now rationed. These firms now
also respond by adopting second-best shorter-term projects, thereby inducing an additional
inflow of second-best projects into the funded region. The process repeats, and a short-
termism spiral arises (see Fig. 1). Taking into account the interdependence between the
3
Fig. 1. Short-termism spiral. Illustration of the short-termism spiral that emerges from
endogenous adjustments on the asset side in response to financing frictions on the liability
side.
asset and liability sides, the equilibrium is thus given by a fixed point: Firms’ investment
decisions respond optimally to financing frictions on the liability side, while financiers take
into account firm’s investment decisions when setting funding terms.
When capital markets are competitive, the resulting equilibrium is constrained inefficient:
Investment is inefficiently short-term, and surplus is strictly lower compared to the case in
which financing is offered by a central planner who is subject to the same informational and
limited-commitment constraints as financiers. The inefficiency of the competitive equilib-
rium arises because of a cross-firm externality: Because they affect the quality of the pool
of firms seeking financing, the asset-side adjustments made by individual firms affect the fi-
nancing terms faced by all firms. When this externality is strong enough, the short-termism
spiral can lead to a complete breakdown of financing across all maturities. When financing
terms are offered by a planner, this negative feedback loop is mitigated. Specifically, a plan-
ner subsidizes long-term projects and taxes short-term projects in order to counteract the
excessive short-termism of the competitive equilibrium.
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Because of their self-reinforcing nature, firms’ privately optimal asset-side adjustments
can amplify shocks. For example, an increase in risk can lead to significantly larger reductions
in financed project maturities and surplus in a setting where firms can adjust their asset
side, relative to the benchmark in which firms’ asset sides are held fixed. We also show
firms’ privately optimal asset-side adjustments can increase or decrease surplus, depending
on the severity of the cross-firm externality. At one extreme, when second-best projects
are essentially as good as first-best projects, the ability of firms to adjust their asset-side
investments increases surplus. In this case, firms that adopt shorter maturity projects do not
impose an externality on other firms; the only consequence from their maturity adjustments
is an increase in output, as formerly rationed firms find shorter maturity projects that can be
funded. On the other hand, when second-best projects are worse than firms’ original projects,
privately optimal asset-side adjustments can lead to an overall reduction in surplus. This
reduction in surplus occurs even when second-best projects have positive NPV and when, as
a result of firms’ asset-side adjustments, more projects get financed such that total lending
increases. Total lending is not a sufficient statistic for surplus because the drop in average
project quality can outweigh the gains from increased investment.
Our theory generates a number of empirical implications. First, by viewing the asset and
liability sides as jointly determined, our model highlights a feedback from financing frictions
on the liability side to asset maturities, which contrasts with the empirical corporate finance
literature which has mostly focused on asset maturity as a determinant of firms’ financing
choices, in particular, debt maturity.5 This feedback from financing frictions to asset matu-
rities is consistent with recent empirical evidence in Gopalan, Mukherjee, and Singh (2014).
5See, e.g., Morris (1992), Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and Mauer (1996), and Johnson (2003).
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Second, our model highlights a novel cross-firm externality: While individual firms find it
optimal to adopt shorter-term projects in order to receive better financing terms, this wors-
ens funding terms for other firms and thereby imposes a negative externality. Identifying
these spillovers poses an interesting challenge for future empirical work. Third, following the
macroeconomics literature on dispersion shocks, our model generates predictions regarding
the dynamics of asset maturities over the business cycle. Consistent with the predictions of
our model, asset maturities shorten during downturns. Dew-Becker (2012) shows that down-
turns are associated with drops in the maturity (or duration) of firms’ real investments. Mian
and Santos (2011), Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2012), and Chen, Xu, and Yang (2012)
document shortening of the maturities of loans and other assets typically held by banks and
financial institutions.
Overall, our results underscore the importance of considering firms’ asset-side decisions
jointly with the financing terms for projects of different maturities. In contrast to a num-
ber of recent papers that follow Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Diamond (1991) in fo-
cusing on early liquidation of (fixed) investment projects in the presence of rollover risk,6
our analysis draws attention to a complementary channel: Non-availability of funding for
long-term projects changes firms’ investment behavior and generates inefficient endogenous
short-termism on the asset side. Unlike other theories of short-termism that have focused on
bad incentives and behavioral biases, such as reputation building (Narayanan, 1985), concern
with near-term stock prices (Stein, 1989), short investor horizons (Froot, Perold, and Stein,
1992), or speculative investors (Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong, 2006), in our framework
6See, e.g., Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011), He and Xiong (2012), and Brunnermeier and Oehmke
(2013).
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short-termism arises as an equilibrium phenomenon in a fully rational setting. Moreover,
short-termism in our model is collective, in the sense that in competitive equilibrium firms
privately optimal decisions reinforce the short-termism in investment decisions.
In highlighting this link between debt financing terms and short-termism in investment,
our paper is related to von Thadden (1995) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), who study
settings in which firms may adopt short-term projects in fear of being liquidated at an interim
date. In contrast to von Thadden (1995), where short-termism is part of a constrained
efficient outcome, our framework highlights a cross-firm externality that leads to constrained
inefficient short-termism. In Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), a related inefficiency can
arise, in the sense that the threat of interim liquidation can lead to multiple Pareto-ranked
equilibria. Cheng and Milbradt (2012) develop a model in which a firm trades off liquidation
costs arising from debt runs against asset-side distortions that arise from managerial risk-
shifting. However, they focus on a single firm, such that the cross-firm externality that is
central to this paper cannot arise.7 In highlighting how endogenous asymmetric information
can lead to cross-firm externalities that can amplify the response of equilibrium prices and
quantities to shocks, our paper is related to Eisfeldt (2004), Kurlat (2013), and Bigio (2011),
who study amplification through asymmetric information in macroeconomic settings without
maturity choice. Finally, as a point of departure, our paper builds on the extensive literature
on credit rationing.8
7A recent paper that highlights spillover effects among firms is Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011). In their
setup, spillovers arise directly in project payoffs (projects become more attractive as more firms invest, leading
to a payoff externality), while in our framework spillovers arise due to endogenous asymmetric information
on the financing side (leading to an information externality).
8For a summary of this literature, a good starting point is the discussion in Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005, Chapter 2), Freixas and Rochet (2008, Chapter 5), or the survey on financial contracting by Harris
and Raviv (1992). The classic contributions on credit rationing are Jaffee and Modigliani (1969), Jaffee and
Russell (1976), Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), and DeMeza and Webb (1987). Bester (1985) and Besanko and
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2. Model setup
There is a continuum of firms, each of which is born with an (initial) investment project
of maturity t, drawn uniformly from the interval [0, T ].9 The maturity of a project indicates
how long it takes for the project to pay off: A project of maturity t ∈ [0, T ] generates cash
flow only at date t and no cash flow beforehand (or after). To undertake their projects, firms
seek financing from a financial sector composed of a continuum of competitive, risk-neutral
financiers with deep pockets. For simplicity, we normalize the risk-free rate to zero.
Projects cost one dollar to set up. Once set up, a project can be of two types. With
probability α the project is safe and, at maturity t, pays off R for sure. With probability
1 − α the project is risky and, at maturity, pays off eλtR with probability e−λt and zero
otherwise.10 The risky project therefore has the same expected payoff as the safe project,
but it defaults over time with intensity λ. This generates a natural link between project
maturity and project risk, which is the key assumption in our model.11 At the time of
contracting, neither firms nor financiers know whether a project is safe or risky.12
Thakor (1987) examine the role of collateral as a screening device in models with credit rationing. Suarez and
Sussman (1997) develop an overlapping generations model in which credit rationing can lead to endogenous
business cycles.
9For industrial firms, projects should be interpreted as real investments. For financial institutions, projects
should be interpreted as loan portfolios on the financial institution’s asset side.
10The restriction to two project types is for tractability. More generally, one could also assume a distri-
bution of exponentially compensated project risks λ˜ with a density function f
(
λ˜
)
. Our model is a special
case with mass points at λ˜ = 0 and λ˜ = λ.
11Note that a positive relation between time and risk (after conditioning on observable characteristics) is
a common feature of many standard models in finance, such as structural models of credit risk (e.g., Merton,
1974, and Leland, 1994) and dynamic agency models (e.g., models in the spirit of Sannikov, 2008).
12Our results are robust to a number of variations in these assumptions. For example, it is not necessary
to assume that the drift of bad projects exactly compensates for the default intensity λ. However, this
assumption is convenient because it guarantees that the NPV of bad projects is independent of the project
maturity. Hence, our results are driven by differences in financial frictions (arising from limited commitment)
across different maturities as opposed to differences in NPV across different maturities. It would also be
straightforward to allow for a positive risk-free rate r > 0 (with suitable adjustment to cash flows) or time
dependency in the intensity of default λ(t).
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Firms can freely adjust the maturity of their original project. However, this adjustment
is costly in the sense that a maturity-adjusted project is second best. This assumption
captures that, in adjusting the maturity of its original project, a firm deviates from its first-
best investment strategy. One interpretation of a second-best project with maturity t′ < t is
that the firm implements a rushed version of the original project, in which the firm speeds up
the required research and development, hurries the construction of plants and equipment, or
otherwise cuts corners in the implementation of the project. An alternative interpretation is
in adjusting its maturity the firm literally searches for a new, second-best investment project
that it will undertake instead of the first-best project it was born with.13
Specifically, we assume that when firms adjust the maturity of their project to any t′ ∈[
0, T
]
, the project is less likely to succeed, which we capture by assuming that replacement
projects have an additional probability of default of 1−∆ that applies to both safe and risky
projects.14 This additional default risk of adjusted projects can realize at any point after
contracting up to maturity t′.15 In addition, we assume that there is an arbitrarily small
probability ε that firms who attempt to adjust their maturity are unsuccessful in doing
so and remain stuck at their original maturity with a second-best project.16 Given these
13When the firm is a financial institution, a maturity adjustment should be interpreted as a shortening
of the financial institution’s loan portfolio. The additional default risk should then be interpreted as a
deviation from the type of loans where the financial institution has a comparative advantage. In addition,
the shortening of the financial institution’s loan portfolio may distort the real decisions of the firm funded
by such a loan: Because financing is more short-term, this firm may now alter its investment away from its
first-best investment strategy, thereby increasing the riskiness of the loan portfolio.
14The additional default risk ∆ could also be random, in which case only its mean ∆ would matter.
15The exact specification of when this risk is realized on (0, t] does not matter for our results. The key
assumption is that this risk applies at any point after contracting happens at time t = 0− (i.e., just before
t = 0).
16The main role of this assumption is that after the maturity adjustment all maturities are still populated
by some firms. This means that we do not have to specify out-of-equilibrium beliefs regarding project
maturity choice. In the main text we focus on the case ε→ 0 (i.e., essentially all firms can pick their desired
maturity), in which case the assumption is similar to a trembling-hand refinement. In the Appendix, we also
solve the model for ε > 0.
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assumptions, the NPV of a project of type θ ∈ {1,∆} is given by
NPV (θ, t) = θ
[
αR + (1− α) e−λteλtR
]
− 1 = θR− 1, (1)
such that the NPV of the original project is given by NPVoriginal ≡ NPV (1, t) = R− 1 > 0,
and the NPV of the adjusted project by NPVadjusted ≡ NPV (∆, t) = ∆R− 1.
We make two key assumptions. First, we assume that while the maturity of a project
is commonly observable (such that there is no uncertainty about when a particular project
pays off), whether or not a project is an original project or a project with adjusted maturity
is private information to the firm. This means that firms’ decisions to adjust their project
maturity generate endogenous asymmetric information. Second, we assume that the project
cash flows that are realized at maturity are not contractible, which introduces a limited-
commitment friction in the spirit of Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Hart and Moore
(1994). Specifically, we assume that at maturity it can only be verified whether or not a
project succeeded, but not which exact cash flow, (i.e., R or eλtR), has realized. Therefore,
a successful firm with a risky project, which receives eλtR at maturity, can always claim
to have received only R (the payoff from a safe project), and pocket the difference. This
contracting friction limits the amount financiers can extract from a firm with a successful
project to R.
Because firms’ maturity adjustments are not observable, from the financiers’ point of
view firms with second-best projects are indistinguishable from firms with first-best projects.
Moreover, firms with first-best projects have no way to separate themselves from second-best
10
firms.17 Hence, financing at any maturity t is only possible if financiers can break even on a
pooling contract. The terms of this pooling contract depend on the endogenous asymmetric
information created by firms’ maturity-adjustment decisions.
3. Competitive equilibrium
We assume that financiers maximize profits and compete by simultaneously offering take-
it-or-leave-it funding schedules contingent on the project maturity t ∈ [0, T ], taking into ac-
count firms’ equilibrium maturity adjustments and the resulting project quality distribution
as a function of project maturity. After funding schedules have been posted, firms make
their maturity adjustments and fund themselves at the best rate they can find, if funding is
available.
We now derive the pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of funding terms and invest-
ment decisions given the setup introduced in Section 2.
Definition 1. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium in competitive capital markets is given by (i)
price schedules of funding conditions offered by financiers and (ii) maturity adjustment de-
cisions by firms, such that:
1. Financiers maximize expected profits by deciding which maturities to fund and posting
deterministic funding terms for these maturities, taking into account firms’ optimal
project maturity adjustments.
2. After observing funding terms offered by financiers, firms adjust maturities to maximize
17There is no scope for signaling in our model. Because, with the exception of default, no interim infor-
mation is revealed, firms with second-best projects can costlessly mimic firms with first-best projects.
11
expected profits.
Three features of this equilibrium warrant brief comment. First, note that we assume that
financiers only compete on price and the set of maturities that is funded deterministically.
This means that we rule out probabilistic funding at a given maturity t. Hence, for any
funded maturity t, firms can fully fund their project at the funding terms offered. Second,
limited liability implies that firms always accept the best available funding terms at their
ultimate project maturity. Thus, the main decision for firms is whether to adjust the maturity
of their project and, if so, what maturity to pick. Third, because financiers act competitively,
in equilibrium they have to break even maturity by maturity. Hence, competition rules out
cross-subsidization across maturities.
Based on these observations, the equilibrium has to satisfy two conditions, which can be
interpreted as individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC ) constraints for
financiers and firms, respectively:
(IR): Investors break even at each funded maturity.
(IC): Given the offered funding terms, firms that are offered funding at their original maturity
have no incentive to adjust the maturity of their projects.
Because cash flows are not verifiable, the optimal financial contract that pools original
and adjusted types takes the from of a debt contract.18 Consider first debt contracts that
match the maturity of the project (as we will show below, this restriction is without loss of
18Note that because we set the low cash flow to zero, debt contracts can, strictly speaking, also be
structured as equity contracts. However, if the payoff in the default state was L > 0, then a debt contract
becomes strictly optimal: To relax the incentive constraint in the high state, it is then optimal to extract as
much as possible in the low state.
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generality). Recall that the limited-commitment friction implies that raising the face value
of debt above R leaves the amount paid back to financiers unchanged because firms with a
payoff higher than R would simply claim to have received R. Thus, the maximum “effective”
face value D of a matching-maturity debt contract is given by
D ≤ R. (2)
Hence, as long as the break-even face value satisfies (2), the financiers’ IR constraint is
satisfied.
To determine the face value of debt, suppose that, at a given maturity t, financiers expect
a proportion p of projects to be original, first-best projects and a proportion 1−p of projects to
be maturity-adjusted, second-best projects. The financiers’ break-even constraint, assuming
D ≤ R, is then given by
1 = p
[
αD + (1− α) e−λtD
]
+ (1− p) ∆
[
αD + (1− α) e−λtD
]
= β
[
α + (1− α) e−λt
]
D, (3)
where
β ≡ p+ (1− p) ∆ (4)
captures the average quality of projects at maturity t.19 Solving the break-even constraint
19This interpretation follows from the observation that the expected NPV of a project of maturity t which
has a probability p of being first-best is given by pNPVoriginal + (1− p)NPVadjusted = βR− 1.
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for D, we have
Dc (t, β) =
1
β [α + (1− α) e−λt] , (5)
where the subscript c denotes that this is the competitive face value. Note that the break-
even face value is increasing in project maturity t, reflecting the higher risk of projects of
longer maturity, and decreasing in the average quality of projects β.
Focusing on debt contracts that match the maturity of the project is without loss of
generality: Allowing for rollover contracts does not change the equilibrium funding terms
or which projects are undertaken in equilibrium. The intuition for this result is that, given
our assumptions, rollover contracts do not add to the contracting environment. Because
there are no intermediate signals about project type (except for the realization of default),
any sequence of rollover contracts is payoff equivalent to a debt contract that matches the
maturity of the project.
Proposition 1. Any sequence of rollover debt contracts is payoff equivalent to the matching-
maturity debt contract. The sequence of debt contracts that firms choose to finance their
projects is indeterminate. A project can be financed if and only if it can be financed with a
matching-maturity debt contract.
In the presence of a small cost of rolling over debt, the above irrelevance result no longer
holds, and firms match maturities of assets and liabilities in the unique equilibrium that
survives the D1 criterion, a standard refinement used in signaling games. 20
Proposition 2. Suppose there is a small debt rollover cost c and that the additional de-
fault risk (1−∆) realizes continuously over
[
0, T
]
. Then, under the D1 refinement, in any
20Condition D1 is an equilibrium refinement that requires out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be placed on types
that have the most to gain from deviating from a fixed equilibrium (see Banks and Sobel, 1987).
14
equilibrium all firms use maturity-matching debt contracts.
The intuition for this results is straightforward. Firms that have adjusted the maturity
of their project default with higher probability. This implies that they end up paying the
full sequence of rollover costs c less often, which makes a deviation to rollover financing more
attractive for firms with maturity-adjusted projects than for firms that have not adjusted
the maturity of their project. Under the D1 criterion, financiers then attribute any deviation
to rollover financing to firms with second-best, maturity-adjusted projects, making such a
deviation unprofitable. On the other hand, any deviation from a rollover contract to maturity
matching is attributed to firms with first-best projects, making such a deviation profitable
and thereby ruling out rollover equilibria.
3.1. Benchmark: Fixed asset side
Before we characterize the full equilibrium with endogenous asset side, we briefly consider
the equilibrium under the assumption that firms’ assets are fixed (i.e., firms cannot adjust
the maturity of their project).
When firms cannot adjust their maturity, all projects are original, first-best projects,
such that for all maturities the pool quality is β = 1. When Dc
(
T , 1
)
≤ R, all projects
can be funded. In this case, contractual frictions are small enough, such that the limited-
commitment constraint never precludes financing at any maturity. When Dc
(
T , 1
)
> R,
on the other hand, projects beyond some critical maturity Tb < T cannot be funded. For
project maturities larger than Tb, financiers cannot break even because contractual frictions
are too severe and maturity rationing arises, as illustrated in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2. Fixed asset side: Face value and maturity. The figure illustrates the benchmark
case with a fixed asset side. For maturities below 8.4 years, the required face value Dc(t, 1)
lies below R. In this region, a break-even debt contract exists, such that the financiers’ IR
constraint is satisfied. Beyond a maturity of 8.4 years, the required face value exceeds R,
such that a debt contract cannot break even. These maturities are rationed; they cannot be
funded in equilibrium.
The main takeaway from this benchmark case with fixed asset side is therefore that,
when contractual frictions are sufficiently large, some long-term projects cannot be funded.
In the full model with endogenous asset side, this implies that firms with rationed long-term
investment projects adopt second-best, shorter-term projects, thereby inducing the short-
termism spiral illustrated in Fig. 1. For the remainder of the paper we concentrate on the
case in which contractual frictions are significant and assume that Dc
(
T , 1
)
> R, such that
some maturities are rationed even when all projects are original.
3.2. Full model: Endogenous asset side
We now solve for the equilibrium with endogenous asset side. As discussed above, this
requires making sure that both the IC constraint (firms funded at their original maturity
have no incentive to adjust their maturity) and the IR constraint (investors break even at
each funded maturity) are satisfied. In contrast to the model with fixed asset side, the
project quality (i.e., the mix of first- and second-best projects) at any given maturity is now
endogenous because it depends on firms’ equilibrium asset-side adjustments.
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We start by making an observation that will significantly simplify our analysis. Denote
the set of funded maturities by F . Given a face value D, the expected payoff to a firm that
funds a project of type θ ∈ {1,∆} and maturity t ∈ F is then given by
pi (θ, t,D) = θ
[
α (R−D) + (1− α) e−λt
(
eλtR−D
)]
= θ
[
R−D
(
α + (1− α) e−λt
)]
. (6)
Suppose the average quality at maturity t is given by βt. Then, inserting the expression for
the competitive face value Dc (t, βt), we see that
pi (θ, t,Dc (t, βt)) = θ
[
R− 1
βt + (1− βt) ∆
]
, t ∈ F . (7)
Hence, the expected profit conditional on average project quality βt is independent of project
maturity.
This observation has two important implications. First, conditional on adjusting their
maturity, firms must be indifferent between all maturities that are funded in equilibrium.
Formally, this requires that
pi (∆, t′, Dc (t′, βt′)) = pi (∆, t, Dc (t, βt)) ,∀t, t′ ∈ F , (8)
which implies that the average project quality must be constant on the funded set, βt′ = βt =
β, requiring that non-funded firms adjust their maturity uniformly into the funded interval.
Second, combining (7) and (8), we see that it is never optimal for firms to adjust their
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maturity unless they cannot get funding otherwise: If a firm’s original project can get funded,
it is more profitable for the firm to fund the original project rather than adopting a second-
best project:
min
t∈F
pi (1, t, D (t, βt)) ≥ max
t∈F
pi (∆, t, D (t, βt)) , (9)
with strict inequality for ∆ < 1. We can therefore ignore the IC constraint: In equilibrium,
all firms with original project maturities that cannot be funded adjust the maturities of their
projects, whereas firms that can obtain funding for their original project do not adjust their
project maturity and simply fund their original project.
The unique (pure-strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium takes the form of a cut-off equi-
librium F = [0, T ], which we simply identify by the maximum funded maturity T .
Lemma 1. Equilibrium funding strategies take the form [0, T ].
Given this cut-off structure, the proportion of first-best projects (the average pool quality)
on the funded set is given by p (T ) = T
T
so that the average quality on the funded set [0, T ]
is given by
β (T ) = T
T
+ ∆T − T
T
(10)
so that ∆ ≤ β (T ) ≤ 1 and β′ (T ) = 1−∆
T
> 0. This is illustrated in Fig. 3. The left panel
depicts the maturity distribution of projects before maturity adjustment. All projects are
original, first-best projects. The right panel depicts the maturity distribution of projects
after maturity adjustment. Firms with original projects beyond T = 6 adjust their maturity
uniformly into the funded interval. An arbitrarily small fraction of firms gets stuck at their
original maturity and does not receive funding.
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Fig. 3. Project density and quality as a function of project maturity when the cut-
off is T = 6 and everyone above T adjusts the maturity of their projects. The left panel
depicts the maturity distribution of projects before maturity adjustment. All projects are
original, first-best projects. The right panel depicts the maturity distribution of projects
after maturity adjustment. Firms with original projects beyond T = 6 adjust their maturity
uniformly into the funded interval. An arbitrarily small fraction of firms gets stuck at their
original maturity and does not receive funding.
The competitive equilibrium is then given by the largest funding cut-off T ∈
[
0, T
]
such
that the IR constraint Dc (T, β (T )) ≤ R is satisfied. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Define IRc =
{
T ∈
[
0, T
]
: Dc (T, β (T )) ≤ R
}
. Then the competitive equi-
librium is given by the funding cut-off Tc = sup IRc, unless IRc = ∅, in which case funding
completely unravels at all maturities. A sufficient condition for complete unraveling is that
D
(
T , 1
)
> R and ∆ < min
{
1− (1− α)λTR, 1/R
}
.
In competitive equilibrium, funding is provided up to the longest maturity for which
both the IC and the IR constraints are satisfied. However, because the IC constraint is
non-binding in the competitive equilibrium, it is sufficient to concentrate on financiers’ IR
constraint, as stated in Proposition 3. When there is maturity rationing in the benchmark
case without asset-side adjustments (i.e., Dc
(
T , 1
)
> R ), then Tc is the largest maturity
on
[
0, T
]
for which the financiers’ IR constraint holds with equality, Dc (T, β (T )) = R.
When there is no funding cut-off that satisfies the financiers’ IR constraint, (i.e., IRc = ∅),
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then funding completely unravels for all maturities and Tc = ∅. The sufficient condition for
complete unraveling has a natural interpretation. Some maturities have to be rationed even
if all projects are original, and maturity-adjusted projects must have low NPV, such that
the dilution effect of maturity-adjusted projects is sufficiently strong.
Why is funding provided up to the longest maturity at which the IR constraint can be
satisfied? Suppose that funding is instead provided up to a funding cut-off T ∈ IRc with
T < Tc. Then, there is a profitable deviation in which a financier increases the range of funded
maturities he offers. As a result of this deviation, fewer firms adjust their maturity, such
that the average project quality the financier is facing improves. This allows the financier to
charge a lower interest rate and thereby undercut the other financiers, attracting all firms
at a funding rate that is strictly profitable. Financiers compete in this fashion until funding
is provided up to Tc.
Given that the equilibrium requires that the face value at the financing cut-off is weakly
smaller than R, it is instructive to consider how the face value at the maximum funded
maturity, Dc (T, β (T )), is affected by a small change in the funding threshold T . Writing
out the derivative, we have
dDc (T, β (T ))
dT
= Dc (T, β (T ))2 × (11)λ (1− α) e−λTβ (T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Maturity effect
−
[
α + (1− α) e−λT
]
β′ (T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dilution effect
 .
Thus, a reduction in the maximum funded maturity T has two countervailing effects. The
maturity effect leads to a decrease in the required face value because, all else equal, funding
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shorter-maturity projects is less risky. The dilution effect, on the other hand, implies that
reducing the maximum funded maturity leads to more maturity adjustment and thereby
(weakly) lowers the average project quality on the funded interval (since β′ (T ) > 0). This
leads to an increase in the required break-even face value.
Finally, we make a brief remark on the different roles played by financiers and firms in
the competitive equilibrium: Financiers take into account that any deviation strategy that
offers funding to a range of maturities that was previously unfunded affects the incentives of
all. This is because such a deviation changes the IC constraint at every maturity. Hence,
financiers internalize the effect of their funding decisions on the average project quality.
Firms, on the other hand, ignore the impact of their individual asset-side decisions on the
aggregate outcome because they take the average pool quality as given. This difference
between firms and financiers is driven by the scale of their impact: Each firm can only
undertake one infinitesimal project and thus cannot affect the aggregate. Financiers, on
the other hand, can affect the aggregate: Financiers have deep pockets and, therefore, the
contracts they offer affect the behavior of a mass of firms.
4. Central planner equilibrium
We now contrast the competitive equilibrium derived above with the allocation that
would be implemented by a central planner facing the same informational and contractual
constraints as the financiers (as well as the same restriction to pure strategies). The main
difference between the solution to the constrained planner’s problem and the competitive
equilibrium is that, in contrast to competitive financiers, the planner can cross-subsidize
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across maturities: While the planner also has to break even, he faces an aggregate break-
even constraint over the entire funded interval [0, Tcp]. Competitive financiers, on the other
hand, have to break even maturity by maturity, which rules out cross-subsidization across
maturities.21
4.1. Constrained inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium
We first demonstrate that the competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient. To show
this, we demonstrate that a constrained planner can raise surplus by raising face values on
short-term projects (effectively taxing them) and using the proceeds to fund more long-term
projects, some of them at strictly subsidized rates. Such a cross-subsidization scheme reduces
firms’ incentive to adopt second-best projects of shorter maturity, leading to an increase in
surplus.
To see this, consider the competitive equilibrium allocation, in which funding is provided
on the set F = [0, Tc]. Recall that in the competitive equilibrium, the IR constraint is
binding at Tc (i.e., Dc (Tc, β (Tc)) = R) and slack for any t < Tc (i.e., Dc (t, β (Tc)) < R).
Also recall that the IC constraint is slack everywhere, which implies that
min
t∈F
pi (1, t, Dc (t, β (Tc))) > max
t∈F
pi (∆, t, Dc (t, β (Tc))) . (12)
Starting from the competitive equilibrium, now consider raising all face values by a factor of
1 + η (a proportional tax), except in cases where this would increase the face value beyond
21In contrast to some of the standard explanations of short-termism as resulting from bad incentives
or behavioral biases, in our framework, constrained inefficient short-termism emerges as an equilibrium
phenomenon in a fully rational setting. We provide a more detailed discussion of our results in relation to
existing academic research and the current policy discussion on short-termism in Section 5.4.
22
R:
Dη (t, β) = min {(1 + η)Dc (t, β) , R} . (13)
By charging more than the competitive face value, a planner offering this face-value schedule
makes strictly positive profits on the interval [0, Tc], without violating the IC constraint (for
small enough η, firms located at Tc still strictly prefer to fund their original project). The
planner can then use these profits to offer funding to firms located on (Tc, Tc + δ]. Because
the IC constraint is slack at Tc, by continuity there exist η > 0 and δ > 0 such that the
IC constraint is also satisfied on (Tc, Tc + δ] and the central planner makes non-negative
profits in aggregate. Under the assumption that Tc ∈
[
0, T
)
, such a funding scheme leads
to a welfare improvement because an additional measure δ/T > 0 of first-best projects are
funded. In the competitive allocation, these firms would have adopted second-best projects of
shorter maturity, thereby inducing a loss of surplus. Hence, for any Tc ∈
[
0, T
)
, a constrained
planner funds a larger set of maturities and thereby a larger number of first-best projects
than the competitive market. Some of the additionally funded maturities receive funding on
strictly subsidized terms.
Proposition 4. Assume Tc ∈
[
0, T
)
. The competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient.
A constrained central planner always funds more maturities than the competitive market,
i.e., Tcp > Tc.
4.2. Optimal funding schedules
We now derive the optimal funding terms offered by (i) a constrained central planner and
(ii) a monopolistic financier. To do so, we first establish a result on the optimal implemen-
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tation of funding, which we then use to characterize the funding terms offered by a central
planner and a monopolist.
Consider funding up to a maturity threshold T with the possibility of cross-subsidizing
across maturities. Such a scheme requires picking a funding schedule DT (t), subject to the
IC constraint (9) and the maximum face-value constraint (2). There is also a new maturity-
adjustment constraint,
dT (t) = δtmax (t)
T − T
T
, tmax ≡ sup
{
arg max
t∈[0,T ]
pi (∆, t, DT (t))
}
, (14)
where dT (t) is the density of second-best projects that locate at maturity t and δtmax (t) is
the Dirac Delta function.22 The maturity-adjustment constraint (14) captures the behavior
of firms that choose to adjust the maturity of their project: These firms optimally choose the
funded maturity that gives them the highest expected profit pi, as identified by the argmax
operator.23
The overall profit to the financier is then given by
Π (T, dT (t)) =
ˆ T
0
{( 1
T
+ dT (t) ∆
) [
α + (1− α) e−λt
]
DT (t)− 1
( 1
T
+ dT (t)
)}
dt. (15)
Lemma 2. The maximum profit funding schedule for a funding interval [0, T ] is given by
22The Dirac Delta function δt (s) concentrates all probability mass at a point t, e.g.,
´∞
0 f (s) δt (s) ds =
f (t).
23Recall that the NPV of the adjusted project is constant. Hence, if the expected profit to firms is constant
on some set of maturities, then the expected profit to the financier also has to be constant on that set (the
two have to add up to the NPV of the project). If the argmax set above is not a singleton, we can therefore,
without loss of generality, assume that firms pick the highest maturity tmax in the argmax set without
affecting any of the expected payoffs.
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the continuous function
DT (t) = min {C (T )Dc (t, 1) , R} , (16)
where C (T ) ≡ R
(
α + (1− α)
[
(1−∆) + ∆e−λT
])
. Define TC (T ) ∈
[
0, T
]
to be the matu-
rity at which C (T )Dc (t, 1) = R. Then the IC constraint is binding on [0, TC (T )] and the
IR constraint is binding on [TC (T ) , T ].
Inserting the maximum profit funding schedule DT (t) into (15), we obtain a profit func-
tion Π (T ), that satisfies Π (0) = ∆R− 1 = NPVadjusted. Optimality of the funding schedule
implies that for any break-even competitive cut-off T ∈ IRc 6= ∅, the optimal scheme at
least breaks even, Π (T ) ≥ 0.
Proposition 5. Let IRcp,m be the set of funding cut-offs T for which the optimal funding
scheme at least breaks even, i.e., IRcp,m =
{
T ∈
[
0, T
]
: Π (T ) ≥ 0
}
. Then the set of cut-offs
that can be funded is larger under the optimal scheme than under the competitive scheme:
IRc ⊂ IRcp,m. No funding is possible under the optimal funding schedule, ICcp,m = ∅, if
and only if max
{
Π (0) ,Π
(
T
)}
< 0.
Central planner. We first characterize the optimal funding schedule offered by a central
planner. The central planner’s objective is to maximize surplus. As we saw above, in
doing so the central planner effectively taxes shorter-maturity projects and subsidizes longer-
maturity projects, in order to keep firms with first-best projects of longer maturity from
adopting second-best shorter-term projects. In choosing the funding cut-off T , the central
planner picks the split between how many first-best projects (T
T
) and how many second-
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best projects (T−T
T
) are funded. Because NPVoriginal > NPVadjusted, the central planner
picks the maximum T that still fulfills the aggregate break-even constraint across all funded
maturities, i.e., Π(Tcp) ≥ 0:
Proposition 6. Assume IRcp,m 6= ∅. The central planner picks the largest funding threshold
Tcp = sup IRcp,m. Further,
1. if Π
(
T
)
≥ 0, all maturities are funded: Tcp = T ,
2. if Π
(
T
)
< 0, there is limited funding Tcp ∈
(
Tc, T
)
.
Monopolist. Now consider funding by a monopolist. Like the central planner, the mo-
nopolist can cross-subsidize across maturities. Unlike the central planner, the monopolist
maximizes profits, not surplus, and thus does not necessarily pick the highest T at which
profits are non-negative.
The monopolist’s optimal funding scheme features a trade-off between the appropriabil-
ity of surplus and the amount of surplus generated: Because project risk and, therefore,
contractual frictions are increasing in maturity, all else equal the monopolist can extract less
profit from longer-maturity projects, whereas the monopolist can extract all surplus from
projects of extremely short maturity (i.e., as project maturity approaches zero). At the same
time, a higher funding threshold T increases the proportion of good projects funded, and
thus increases total surplus. This trade-off results in a corner solution:
Proposition 7. Assume IRcp,m 6= ∅. The monopolist financier picks a corner solution,
Tm ∈
{
0, T
}
. Further,
1. if Π (0) > Π
(
T
)
, the monopolist only funds extremely short-term projects: Tm = 0,
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2. if Π
(
T
)
> Π (0), the monopolist offers funding for all maturities: Tm = T .
Hence, when it is difficult to extract surplus at longer maturities (case 1), the monopolist
only offers funding for extremely short-term projects (Tm = 0). In response, all firms adopt
projects of extremely short maturity and the monopolist appropriates all surplus from these
projects. Given that Π (0) > 0 implies that Dc (0, β (0)) < R, competitive financiers would
finance a strictly larger set of maturities, thereby generating higher overall surplus than the
monopolist. The central planner offers an even higher funding cut-off, Tcp ≥ Tc > Tm = 0,
as shown in Proposition 7.
When the monopolist can appropriate sufficient surplus at longer horizons (case 2), it
offers funding for all maturities (Tm = T ). In this case, it is possible that, due to the
monopolist’s ability to cross-subsidize, surplus under monopolistic financing is higher than
under competitive financing. Whenever the monopolist offers funding for all maturities, the
central planner would do the same. However, the reverse is not generally true: Full funding
by the central planner (Tcp = T ) does not necessarily imply full funding by the monopolist.
When Π (0) > Π
(
T
)
> 0, then the central planner funds all maturities, Tcp = T , whereas
the monopolist offers funding only for very short-term projects, Tm = 0. We summarize the
above discussion in the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The monopolist always funds a weakly smaller set of maturities than the central
planner: Tm ≤ Tcp. Specifically,
1. if Tcp = T , then Tm = 0 if Π (0) > Π
(
T
)
and Tm = T otherwise,
2. if Tcp ∈
[
0, T
)
, then T > Tcp ≥ Tc > Tm = 0.
Conversely,
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1. if Tm = T , then Tcp = T ,
2. if Tm = 0, then T ≥ Tcp ≥ Tc > Tm = 0.
Finally, if Tc ∈
[
0, T
]
, then Tcp ≥ Tc ≥ 0 and Tm ∈
{
0, T
}
.
5. Discussion
5.1. Amplification of shocks through collective short-termism
One important implication of our model is that endogenous asset-side adjustments may
amplify shocks compared to the benchmark case without asset-side adjustments. Below, we
illustrate this amplification by investigating the comparative statics of our equilibrium in
response to changes in λ. Recall that λ parameterizes the risk inherent in risky projects and
therefore captures the severity of the contracting friction that arises from limited commit-
ment: An increase in λ increases the amount successful firms with risky projects can abscond
with.
The comparative statics with respect to the contracting friction λ are illustrated in Fig.
4. The left panel illustrates the maximum funded maturity as a function of λ. The dashed
line depicts the benchmark case in which firms cannot adjust their investment decisions. The
solid line depicts the equilibrium maximum funded maturity after privately optimal asset-
side adjustments by firms. In the benchmark case, all maturities receive financing when λ
is sufficiently low. However, once the contracting friction λ crosses a threshold, some long
maturities cannot be financed. This captures the rationing of maturities in the benchmark
model, as illustrated in Fig. 2. The solid line in Fig. 4 depicts the full equilibrium with
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asset-side adjustments. Relative to the benchmark case, we see that due to the endogenous
maturity adjustments by firms, the range of funded maturities drops significantly faster than
in the benchmark case. The figure also illustrates that a constrained planner funds a strictly
larger set of maturities than competitive financiers.24
The right panel in Fig. 4 depicts the percentage change in surplus (aggregate NPV)
that arises from firms’ asset-side adjustments for two values of the dilution parameter ∆.
The figure shows that, over a large range of values for the contracting friction λ, firms’
privately optimal maturity adjustments amplify shocks to λ, in the sense that they exacerbate
reductions in surplus relative to the benchmark case without maturity adjustments. In this
region, overall surplus is lower despite the fact that free maturity choice allows all firms to
invest. This is because firms’ privately optimal maturity adjustments reduce the quality
of the average project that is financed, leading to an overall decrease in surplus. Note,
however, that this can reverse for high values of λ: When limited commitment frictions
in the benchmark case are sufficiently large, then the increase in investment under free
maturity choice outweighs the reduction in the average quality of funded projects. In this
region, firms’ maturity adjustments dampen shocks to λ. The region where the reduction in
average quality dominates (and maturity adjustments amplify shocks) is larger the stronger
the dilution from second-best projects (lower ∆).
24In addition, note that there is a region where the constrained planner is able to use his ability to
cross-subsidize to fund a larger range of maturities than in the benchmark case.
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Fig. 4. Equilibrium with (i) exogenous and (ii) endogenous asset side as a func-
tion of the contracting friction λ. The left panel depicts maximum funded maturities
in the benchmark model without asset-side adjustments (Tb, dashed line), the competitive
equilibrium with endogenous asset side (Tc, solid line), and the equilibrium in the presence
of a constrained central planner (Tcp, dash-dotted line). The right panel depicts the per-
centage change in total surplus that results from asset-side adjustments in the competitive
equilibrium relative to the case with exogenous asset side, (Wc −Wb) /Wb. The solid line
depicts the change in welfare resulting from the same dilution parameter (∆ = 0.85) that is
used in the left panel, whereas the dotted line depicts the change in welfare resulting from
a lower dilution parameter (∆ = 0.81).
5.2. Are firms’ privately optimal maturity adjustments efficient?
As illustrated in the previous subsection, whether firms’ privately optimal maturity ad-
justments are socially desirable depends on the degree to which second-best projects are
inferior to first-best projects, which is captured by the dilution parameter ∆. To see this
more clearly, we can decompose the change in total surplus, into two components, a credit
expansion effect and a dilution effect:
Wc −Wb =
(
T − Tb
T
)
NPVadjusted︸ ︷︷ ︸
Credit expansion
− Tb − Tc
T
[NPVoriginal −NPVadjusted]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dilution effect
, (17)
where Tc ≤ Tb denote the equilibrium funding cut-offs in the full model with endogenous asset
side and in the benchmark model without maturity adjustments, respectively. The credit
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expansion effect measures the effect of firms’ maturity adjustments, holding the funding
threshold fixed at Tb. When the funding threshold is held fixed, the ability to adjust project
maturity means that firms with initial project maturities on
(
Tb, T
]
adjust the maturity of
their project and find funding on [0, Tb]. This effect leads to an increase in surplus whenever
second-best projects have positive NPV (i.e., when NPVadjusted = ∆R − 1 > 0). However,
as we saw above, the inflow of second-best projects dilutes the pool of funded projects and,
via the short-termism spiral illustrated in Fig. 1, decreases the funding threshold from Tb
to Tc. The dilution effect captures the loss of surplus that arises because firms with original
project maturities in (Tc, Tb] cannot fund their original project and choose a second-best
shorter-term project. Firms privately optimal maturity adjustments increase surplus if and
only if the credit expansion effect outweighs the dilution effect.
Proposition 8. Assume that Tb ≥ 0 and Tc ≥ 0. Firms’ privately optimal maturity adjust-
ments reduce welfare if and only if
NPVoriginal (Tb − Tc) ≥ NPVadjusted
(
T − Tc
)
. (18)
To see the two effects at work, consider two special cases. First, when ∆ = 1, maturity-
adjusted projects are just as good as firms’ original projects. In this case, firms’ maturity
adjustments do not affect the average quality of projects, such that the cut-off remains un-
changed, Tc = Tb. Hence, only the credit expansion effect is present: Firms that were unable
to receive financing at their original maturity can now finance an equally attractive positive
NPV project of shorter maturity. This results in an unambiguous increase in welfare. Firms’
ability to adjust the maturity of their projects helps them circumvent financing frictions for
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Fig. 5. Equilibrium with (i) exogenous and (ii) endogenous asset side as a function
of the dilution parameter ∆. The left panel illustrates the equilibrium maximum funded
maturity. The dashed line depicts the maximum maturity in the benchmark model with
exogenous asset side, Tb, which does not depend on the dilution parameter ∆. The solid line
depicts the maximum funded maturity in the competitive equilibrium, Tc, with endogenous
asset side, which illustrates how dilution through second-best projects shrinks the range of
financed maturities. The dash-dotted line illustrates the maximum maturity funded by a
constrained central planner, Tcp. The right panel depicts the percentage change in surplus
(Wc −Wb) /Wb that results from firms’ privately optimal asset-side adjustments (solid line).
The vertical line depicts the value of ∆ such that NPVadjusted = 0.
long-term projects without imposing externalities on other firms.
Second, consider the case in which ∆ is such that maturity-adjusted projects have zero
NPV (i.e., ∆ = 1/R). In this case, a firm that manages to obtain funding by adjusting its
maturity adds nothing to the aggregate NPV produced. Hence, the credit expansion effect
is zero, and only the dilution effect is present: Through its maturity-adjustment decision,
the firm reduces the average quality of projects, which leads to a reduction in the maximum
funded maturity, such that some firms that were able to fund their original project are now
forced to also adjust their maturity. Hence, when second-best projects have zero NPV (or
worse), privately optimal maturity-adjustment decisions lead to an unambiguous reduction
in surplus and are therefore socially undesirable. For values of ∆ that lie in between these
two polar cases, ∆ ∈
(
1
R
, 1
)
, both the credit expansion effect and the dilution effect are
present, such that the net effect depends on their relative size.
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We illustrate these results in Fig. 5, which plots maximum funded maturities (left panel)
and the percentage change in surplus that results from firms’ privately optimal asset-side
adjustments (right panel) as a function of the dilution parameter ∆. The left panel illustrates
that the ability for firms to adjust their maturity leads to a reduction in the maximum
funded maturity relative to the benchmark case, where the maximum funded maturity is
independent of ∆. The reduction in the maximum funded maturity is larger when the
dilution effect of second-best projects stronger (i.e., smaller ∆). For the parameters in the
figure, funding completely unravels when second-best projects become negative NPV, as
indicated by the vertical line in the graph. In contrast to the competitive equilibrium, the
maximum maturity implemented by the central planner increases (weakly) as ∆ decreases.
This is the case because lower ∆ relaxes the IC constraint (9), which allows the central
planner to cross-subsidize more aggressively.25
In the right panel, the solid line depicts the percentage change in surplus (aggregate NPV)
that results from firms’ privately optimal maturity-adjustment decisions. When there is no
or very little quality difference between first-best and second-best projects (i.e., ∆ close to 1),
surplus increases when firms can adjust their project maturity. Thus, for high ∆, the credit
expansion effect outweighs the dilution effect: While firms’ maturity adjustments reduce the
average quality of funded projects, this negative quality effect is initially outweighed by the
increase in the number of projects that can attract financing. In this region, firms’ privately
optimal maturity adjustments are socially desirable. For low ∆, on the other hand, overall
25Note that this implies that welfare under a constrained central planner is non-monotonic in ∆. For
low values of ∆, all maturities are funded due to aggressive cross-subsidization of maturities. As ∆ and
the IC constraint starts binding increases, Tcp < T , such that welfare decreases. However, as ∆ increases
towards one, the fact that the IC constraint restricts the funding threshold Tcp matters less and less, because
second-best projects become closer to first-best projects.
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surplus decreases relative to the benchmark case, despite the fact that total lending increases.
Hence, an increase in lending is not a sufficient condition for an increase in surplus. Finally,
the figure illustrates that overall surplus can decrease even when second-best projects have
positive NPV (which, in the figure, is the case to the right of the vertical line). Hence, while
a second-best project may have positive NPV when seen in isolation, the adoption of positive
NPV second-best projects can lead to a decrease in aggregate surplus via the dilution effect.
This result illustrates the importance of taking into account cross-firm externalities when
evaluating firms’ investment choices.
5.3. Empirical implications
In this section, we briefly discuss the empirical implications of our model and relate our
findings to the stylized facts documented in the empirical literature. The main novelty of
our analysis is to highlight the joint determination of financing terms and project maturities
and the cross-firm externalities that arise in such a setting.
First, viewing the asset and liability sides as jointly determined highlights a potentially
important feedback from financing frictions on the liability side to investment decisions on
the asset side. The empirical corporate finance literature has mostly focused on the opposite
direction, by investigating asset maturity as a determinant of firms’ financing choices, in
particular, debt maturity (Morris, 1992; Guedes and Opler, 1996; Stohs and Mauer, 1996;
Johnson, 2003). In contrast, our model emphasizes the feedback effect of financing terms
for projects of different maturities (in particular, the non-availability of funding for long-
term projects) on firms’ asset maturities. Recent evidence by Gopalan, Mukherjee, and
Singh (2014) suggests that taking into account the feedback from financing terms to asset
maturity may be a first-order consideration: Taking advantage of a natural experiment (the
creation of debt recovery tribunals in India), they show that a reduction in enforcement
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constraints that increased the availability of funding for long-term projects indeed led to an
increase in asset maturity among affected firms, consistent with the predictions of our model.
Second, our model highlights a novel cross-firm externality: While individual firms find
it optimal to adopt shorter-term projects in order to receive better financing terms, this
privately optimal action affects funding terms for other firms and thereby imposes a negative
externality. From an empirical perspective, our model thus implies that there are cross-
firm spillovers in investment horizons (i.e., funded project maturities) of firms and financial
institutions. Identifying these spillovers poses an interesting challenge for future empirical
work.
Third, our model generates comparative static predictions regarding the dynamics of
short-termism over the business cycle. In particular, a recent strand of literature in macroe-
conomics (Bloom, 2009; Bloom, Floetotto, Jaimovich, Saporta-Eksten, and Terry, 2012;
Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno, 2014) points out that the dispersion of revenues and prof-
its increases during recessions and that this increase in risk can be a first-order driver of
the business cycle. In our model, this view of dispersion-driven business cycles translates
into a comparative static exercise with respect to the dispersion parameter λ. In addition
to predicting a reduction in output in response to a dispersion shock—which has been the
focus of many of the macro papers on this issue—our model makes the further prediction
that investment horizons (asset maturities) shorten during recessions. Such asset maturity
shortening should occur both for firms (the maturities of projects firms invest in) and for
banks (the maturities of bank loans issued). This prediction is supported in the data. On
the firm side, Dew-Becker (2012) documents that downturns are, indeed, associated with
more short-term investment: lower output and higher unemployment predict lower duration
investments by firms. Because of the cross-firm externality that arises in our model, such
a shift in the composition (rather than just the quantity) of investment may constitute a
significant amplification channel of the business cycle. Similarly, the maturities of bank loans
(and other debt issues) shrink during recessions, as documented by Mian and Santos (2011)
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and Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2012).
5.4. Collective short-termism as an equilibrium phenomenon
In this section, we briefly discuss the implications of our model in the context of the larger
debate on short-termism in economic activity. Specifically, whether competitive capital mar-
kets inherently lead to short-term behavior has been a major debate at least since the 1980s,
when a number of commentators and scholars compared the market-based U.S. economy
with the less market-based and supposedly more long-term system in Japan (Corbett, 1987;
Jacobs, 1993; Porter, 1992). Recently, this debate has resurfaced as part of the discussion
of whether advanced and emerging economies will be able to make long-term investments in
infrastructure, research and development, and innovation that are required for sustainable
long-term growth (World Economic Forum, 2011; European Commission, 2013; Group of
Thirty, 2013; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2013).
While many standard explanations of short-termism rely on adverse incentives created
by managerial reputation building (Narayanan, 1985), concern with short-term stock prices
(Stein, 1989), investors with short horizons (Froot, Perold, and Stein, 1992), or speculative
investors (Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong, 2006), in our framework short-termism emerges as
an equilibrium phenomenon in a fully rational setting where managers do not face incentive
problems. Our model thereby highlights that in the presence of contractual incompleteness,
competitive capital markets alone can lead to inefficient short-termism because they rule out
the cross-subsidization required to induce long-term investment. The resulting competitive
equilibrium is constrained inefficient in the sense that a planner subject to identical contrac-
tual and informational frictions could raise surplus. Moreover, short-termism is collective in
the sense that, in competitive equilibrium, firms’ privately optimal decisions reinforce the
short-termism in investment decisions. This suggests that even in the absence of manage-
rial myopia or other short-term biases, renewed focus on fostering an environment that is
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conducive to long-term investment may be desirable.
6. Conclusion
This paper provides a framework to analyze how financing frictions that arise on the
liability side affect firms’ investment decisions on the asset side, and vice versa. In our
model, financing frictions resulting from limited commitment are more pronounced at longer
horizons, leading to credit rationing for long-term investment projects. Firms respond by
adjusting their asset-side investments and adopt alternative projects of shorter maturities,
even if those projects are second best. Because individual firms’ asset-side decisions endoge-
nously determine the magnitude of an asymmetric information friction faced by all firms,
an externality arises, which leads to inefficient short-termism. Firms’ equilibrium asset-
side adjustments amplify shocks and, while privately optimal, can be socially undesirable.
These results highlight the importance of explicitly taking into account the asset side when
analyzing the effect of liability-side frictions, such as pressure toward short-term financing.
At a broader level, while the focus of our paper has been the maturity of firms’ asset-
and liability-side choices, the mechanism behind our results is potentially more general. In
our framework, project maturity is systematically related to risk, which, in the presence
of contractual frictions, makes long-term projects harder to finance. Firms react to this
by attempting to minimize the observable characteristic linked to risk (here: maturity) by
increasing the unobservable portion of their riskiness (here: average quality of the project).
This increase in unobservable risk is what triggers the adverse selection that ultimately leads
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to the cross-firm externalities and investment distortions at the heart of the paper. Similar
distortions may occur along other observable dimensions that are systematically related to
risk and that can be chosen by firms. Potential examples of rationing and cross-firm spillovers
along other dimensions could include investment size or the choice of industry. Even more
directly, the rationing of funding for risky projects may lead to inefficiently low risk-taking
in the economy. We leave these implications for future research.
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Appendix A. Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider an arbitrary rollover schedule [t0, t1, ..., tn], with t0 = 0 and tn = t,
where period i is equal to (ti, ti+1), so that there are a total of n rollover periods. Suppose further
that the total adjusted-project survival probability ∆ can be divided into per-period survival probabilities
P [survival on (ti, ti+1)] = ∆i, so that
∏n
i=0 ∆i = ∆.
Then, consider a situation in which p0 = p is the time-0 expectation of the proportion of good/original
projects, and α0 = α is the time-0 expectation of the proportion of risk-free projects. Then, conditional on
no observed defaults, we have
pi+1 = P [good|pi]
=
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
]
pi[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
]
pi + (1− pi) ∆i
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
]
= pi
pi + (1− pi) ∆i ,
so that the quality (and also the probability of survival conditional on the risk-free project) on i is βi =
pi + (1− pi) ∆. Also, we have
αi+1 = P [risk − free|αi]
= αiβi
αiβi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)βi
= αi
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti) .
Finally, let Di denote the face value of debt payable at ti (i.e., the face value agreed at the beginning of
period i− 1). Then, whenever debt is rolled over from period i to period i+ 1 at ti+1, the company needs to
raise Di+1 via promising Di+2 to be repaid at ti+2, with D0 ≡ 1 (the original investment). Thus, we have
Di = [pi + (1− pi) ∆i]
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
]
Di+1.
Also, note by inspection that Di < Di+1, so that we have the restriction Dn ≤ R. Plugging in repeatedly,
we have
1 = Dn
n−1∏
i=0
[pi + (1− pi) ∆i]
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
]
.
Note that
βiβi+1 = [pi + (1− pi) ∆i] [pi+1 + (1− pi+1) ∆i+1]
= [pi + (1− pi) ∆i] [∆i+1 + pi+1 (1−∆i+1)]
= [pi + (1− pi) ∆i] ∆i+1 + pi (1−∆i+1)
= [pi + (1− pi) ∆i∆i+1] ,
so that
n−1∏
i=0
βi =
n−1∏
i=0
[pi + (1− pi) ∆i] = p0 + (1− p0)
n−1∏
i=0
∆i = p+ (1− p) ∆ = β.
39
Similarly, we have [
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
] [
αi+1 + (1− αi+1) e−λ(ti+2−ti+1)
]
=
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
] [
e−λ(ti+2−ti+1) + αi+1
(
1− e−λ(ti+2−ti+1)
)]
=
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
]
e−λ(ti+2−ti+1) + αi
(
1− e−λ(ti+2−ti+1)
)
=
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)e−λ(ti+2−ti+1)
]
,
so that
n−1∏
i=0
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
]
= α0 + (1− α0)
n−1∏
i=0
e−λ(ti+1−ti) = α+ (1− α) e−λt.
Thus, we can write
1 = Dn
n−1∏
i=0
βi
[
αi + (1− αi) e−λ(ti+1−ti)
]
= Dnβ
[
α+ (1− α) e−λt] ,
which implies that
Dn = Dc (t, β) =
1
β [α+ (1− α) e−λt] .
Hence, the terminal face value Dn is the same as in the no-rollover case, such that the firm cannot gain from
a rollover strategy.
The above irrelevance proposition establishes an indeterminacy result for the maturity of the liability
side of firms. We now break this indeterminacy by introducing a small cost of rolling over debt. This
small rollover cost, in combination with an equilibrium refinement, induces firms to match the maturities of
their assets and liabilities. The equilibrium refinement we use is the relatively powerful D1 criterion, which
requires out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be placed on types that have the most to gain from deviating from
a conjectured equilibrium (see Banks and Sobel, 1987). This is a common equilibrium refinement used to
achieve uniqueness in signaling games. To make this proof without loss of generality, we make the additional
assumption that the additional default risk 1−∆ is continuously distributed over [0, t] (i.e., the additional
default risk has full support over the lifetime of the project).
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that every time a firm rolls over its debt, it incurs a small fixed cost c.
Now conjecture an equilibrium in which firms chose a strictly positive number of rollover dates, n > 0.
Because in this conjectured equilibrium no firms match maturities of debt and assets, we have to formulate
out-of-equilibrium beliefs regarding the type of a firm that deviates to a strategy of matching maturities. We
now show that any conjectured equilibrium of this form does not survive the D1 refinement. Consequently,
the unique equilibrium is one where firms match maturities of assets and liabilities.
To see this, note first that the original type (θ = 1) cannot use more frequent rollover as a signaling
device, because any rollover strategy can be imitated by the ∆ type (firms that have adjusted their maturity)
at a smaller expected cost.26 The reason is that the ∆ type defaults with a higher probability than the 1
type and thus pays the full sequence of rollover costs less frequently. Hence, for a given rollover strategy, the
∆ type always incurs lower expected rollover costs than the 1 type. Now note that according to this logic,
under the D1 criterion any deviation to more frequent rollover has to be attributed to the ∆ type, while any
deviation to less frequent rollover must be attributed to the 1 type. Thus, starting from any equilibrium
with a positive number of rollover dates, the out-of-equilibrium beliefs that firms that match maturities of
assets and liabilities (that is, n = 0) are of type ∆ are not consistent with the D1 refinement, since any such
26This differs from Flannery (1986), where the ability to use rollover debt can lead to a separating equilib-
rium when rolling over has a cost. The main difference relative to our setup is that in Flannery (1986), there
is an observable interim signal about the firm’s quality, which makes rollover debt relatively more costly for
bad firms.
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deviation must be attributed to a firm of type 1. However, this out-of-equilibrium belief makes a deviation
to a no-rollover strategy profitable. This, of course, implies that all equilibria with a strictly positive number
of rollover dates n > 0 can be ruled out via a profitable deviation to a no-rollover strategy. The no-rollover
equilibrium (n = 0), on the other hand, survives, because every deviation from it is attributed to a firm of
type ∆.
For generality, we write the equations below explicitly taking into account the probability ε that a firm
that attempts to change the maturity of its project gets stuck at its original maturity (recall that in the
main text we focus on the limiting case  → 0). Also, for ease of exposition, we define pi (t,D) ≡ pi (1, t,D)
so that pi (θ, t,D) = θpi (t,D). With ε > 0, the IC constraint is easier to satisfy because the probability of
successfully adjusting the maturity is now only 1− ε :
min
t∈F
pi (t,D) ≥ max
t∈F
∆pi (t,D) ≥ max
t∈F
(1− ε) ∆pi (t,D) = max
t∈F
∆εpi (t,D) ,
where we defined
∆ε ≡ (1− ε) ∆.
Further, let
pε (T ) =
T
T + (1− ε) (T − T )
p′ε (T ) =
T (1− ε)[
T + (1− ε) (T − T )]2 > 0.
Because in competitive equilibrium the IC constraint is slack, the only effect of allowing for ε > 0 is that the
equilibrium proportion of original projects is now given by pε (T ). All equations and proofs therefore follow
immediately with a simple substitution of pε (T ) for p (T ) and βε (T ) for β (T ), where
βε (T ) = pε (T ) + [1− pε (T )] ∆.
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider, wlog, the following candidate equilibrium funding profile F = [0, T1]∪ [T2, T3]
with T1 < T2. Equilibrium implies that both the IR and IC constraints hold for all t ∈ F , and additionally
that β is constant on F . We now show that a single financier can offer funding on H = (T1, T2) such that
he only faces original projects and makes strict profits. To do this, he offers a contract
Dhole (t) =
[
R (1−∆ε) + ∆ε
β
]
1
α+ (1− α) e−λt , t ∈ H,
so that the payoff to a firm on H that does not adjust its maturity is given by pi (1, t,Dhole (t)) that fulfills
pi (1, t′, Dc (t′, β)) , t′ ∈ F
=
[
R− 1
β
]
> pi (1, t,Dhole (t)) , t ∈ H
=
[
R−Dhole (t)
(
α+ (1− α) e−λt)] , t ∈ H
= ∆ε
[
R− 1
β
]
= pi (∆ε, t′, Dc (t′, β)) , t′ ∈ F
> pi (∆ε, t,Dhole (t)) , t ∈ H.
Offering funding on H generates strict profits because Dhole (t) > D (t, 1), which follows from
R (1−∆ε) + ∆ε
β
> R (1−∆ε) + ∆ε > 1,
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as β ≤ 1. Thus, given the contract Dhole (t), any firm with an original project of maturity t ∈ H has no
strict incentive to adjust its maturity, any firm t ∈ F has no strict incentive to adjust its maturity, and any
unfunded firm t ∈ (T3, T ] strictly wants to adjust into F only.
Proof of Proposition 3. What remains to be shown for the first part of the proof is that there is no profitable
deviation for projects on
(
Tc, T
]
. The off-equilibrium refinement we will use is similar to a trembling-hand
refinement. Recall that a small fraction ε of projects get stuck at their original maturity when attempting
to adjust the maturity (i.e., they become ∆ types without the benefit of maturity choice). We then note
that all projects on
(
Tc, T
]
are adjusted projects (type ∆). By the definition of Tc (i.e., D (Tc, βε (TC)) = R)
these projects, for any ε ∈ [0, 1], cannot attract financing because
D (t,∆) > D (t, βε (Tc)) > D (Tc, βε (Tc)) = R,∀t ∈
(
Tc, T
]
.
The first inequality stems from βε (Tc) > ∆ and the observation that the face value is decreasing in average
quality. The second inequality stems from t > TC and the observation that the face value is increasing in
maturity. We conclude that, because their outside option of staying put is given by 0, all firms on
(
Tc, T
]
adjust their maturity.
For the second part of the proof, we differentiate (11) to get
dDc (T, β (T ))
dT 2
= 2
Dc (T, β (T ))
(
dDc (T, β (T ))
dT
)2
−λdDc (T, β (T ))
dT
+ λDc (T, β (T ))2
[
(1− α) e−λT − α]β′ (T ) .
Thus, if there exist a Textremal ∈
[
0, T
]
such that
dDc (T, β (T ))
dT
∣∣∣∣
T=Textremal
= 0 ⇐⇒ λ (1− α) e−λTextremal [(1−∆)T + ∆T ] = [α+ (1− α) e−λTextremal] (1−∆) ,
then Textremal is a maximum if and only if
dDc (T, β (T ))
dT 2
∣∣∣∣
T=Textremal
< 0 ⇐⇒ (1− α) e−λTextremal < α.
Suppose there exits a sequence of extremal points 0 < Te1 < Te2 < ... < Ten < .... Consider first the case
dDc(T,β(T ))
dT
∣∣∣
T=0
> 0 ⇐⇒ T > 1−∆λ(1−α)∆ . Then we know that the first extremal point Te1 > 0 has to be a
maximum. But this immediately implies that
(1− α) e−λTe2 < (1− α) e−λTe1 < α
and thus, Te2 also has to be a maximum, which by continuity is impossible. Consider now the case in which
dDc(T,β(T ))
dT
∣∣∣
T=0
< 0 ⇐⇒ T < 1−∆λ(1−α)∆ . Then we know that the first extremal point Te1 > 0 has to be a
minimum and Te2 > Te1 has to be a maximum. But this immediately implies that
(1− α) e−λTe3 < (1− α) e−λTe2 < α < (1− α) e−λTe1
and thus, Te3 also has to be a maximum, which by continuity is impossible. We therefore conclude that at
most one minimum and one maximum exist on [0,∞) with the minimum always smaller than the maximum.
We can derive two sufficient conditions. First, a sufficient condition for complete unraveling of funding
is that
min
{
Dc (0,∆) , Dc
(
T , 1
)}
> R
and that dDc(T,β(T ))dT
∣∣∣
T=0
> 0 ⇐⇒ ∆ > 11+(1−α)λT , because only one maximum exists.
Second, in case we have dDc(T,β(T ))dT
∣∣∣
T=0
< 0, let Te1 be the first extremal point, so that the condition
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becomes min
{
Dc (Te1, β (Te1)) , Dc
(
T , 1
)}
> R. From the first-order condition, we know that
λ (1− α) e−λTe1 T1−∆β (Te1) =
[
α+ (1− α) e−λTe1] ,
so that
Dc (Te1, β (Te1)) =
(1−∆) eλTe1
β (Te1)2 Tλ (1− α)
.
This face value takes the smallest value in the numerator for Te1 = 0 and in the denominator for Te1 = T .
Thus, we have
(1−∆)
Tλ (1− α) > R ⇐⇒ 1− (1− α)λTR > ∆
as a sufficient condition that is not based on the slope at 0. This is the sufficient condition we show in the
text. The interpretation of this condition is that funding completely unravels when second-best projects are
sufficiently bad.
Proof of Lemma 2. Consider funding up to a threshold T , so that F = [0, T ], without the restriction of no
cross-subsidization that arises in the competitive case, and an arbitrary funding schedule DT (t), subject to
the IC constraint
min
t∈[0,T ]
pi (1, t,DT (t)) ≥ max
t∈[0,T ]
(1− ε)pi (∆, t,DT (t)) = max
t∈[0,T ]
pi (∆ε, t,DT (t)) ,
the maximum face-value constraint,
DT (t) ≤ R,∀t ∈ [0, T ] ,
and the maturity-adjustment constraint
dT (t) = δtmax (t)
T − T
T
(1− ε) , tmax ≡ sup
{
arg max
t∈[0,T ]
pi (∆ε, t,DT (t))
}
,
where, as a tie-breaking rule, we assumed that the maximum maturity is chosen in the argmax set. In case
the argmax is not a singleton, we note that the payoff to the investors and the financiers is constant on this
set, and thus, picking the maximum maturity is without loss of generality. The overall profit is then given
by
Π =
ˆ T
0
{(
1
T
+ dT (t) ∆
)[
α+ (1− α) e−λt]DT (t)− 1( 1
T
+ d (t)
)}
dt
= 1
T
ˆ T
0
([
α+ (1− α) e−λt]DT (t)− 1) dt+ T − T
T
(1− ε) (∆ [α+ (1− α) e−λtmax]DT (tmax)− 1)
= 1
T
ˆ T
0
([
α+ (1− α) e−λt]DT (t)− 1) dt+ T − T
T
(
∆ε
[
α+ (1− α) e−λtmax]DT (tmax)− 1 + ε) .
We will now establish a sequence of results. First, the expected profit to firms has to be weakly increasing
in project maturity t. Let us consider two cases. First, supposeDt = R. Then we know that pi is mechanically
increasing in t because
pi (θ, t, R) = θR (1− α) (1− e−λt) .
Thus, whenever the IR constraint is binding, the expected profit to firms is increasing in project maturity.
Second, suppose thatDT (t) < R and that pi (θ, t,DT (t)) is not flat with respect to t. We know that pi (θ, t,D)
is decreasing in D. As pi (θ, t,DT (t)) is not flat, there exists a maximum on [0, T ], and for maturities t′ away
from this maximum the IC constraint is not binding. Then, we can increase DT (t′) and thereby decrease pi
at those maturities t′ for which pi (1, t′, DT (t′)) ≥ mint∈[0,T ] pi (1, t,DT (t)) and DT (t′) < R without affecting
the IC or maturity-adjustment constraint, but increasing the financier’s profit for each maturity t′.
Second, in an optimal funding scheme, on the set where the IR constraint is not binding the IC constraint
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should be uniformly binding. Moreover, at the highest funded maturity the IR constraint should be binding,
i.e., DT (T ) = R. The latter is easy to show. As pi is weakly increasing in t, setting DT (T ) = R relaxes the
IC constraint while raising the highest amount of revenue. In other words, it leaves the minimum amount
to the original and maturity-adjusted firms. Second, suppose the IC constraint is not uniformly binding on
the set on which the IR constraint is slack. Then we can increase DT (t) maturity by maturity on this set
to make the IC constraint uniformly binding, noting that tmax = T and DT (T ) = R, so that the right-hand
side of the maturity-adjustment constraint (14) is unaffected.
Third, analogous to the proof of Lemma 1, funding on non-monotone sets is inefficient.
We can then establish the following result. A funding cut-off T uniquely pins down the face-value
schedule that extracts the most value while fulfilling both the IR and IC constraints. This schedule is given
by the continuous function
DT (t) =
{
C 1
α+(1−α)e−λt , t < TC
R , t ≥ TC
,
where C (T ) is given by
pi (1, 0, DT (0)) = pi (∆ε, T,R)
⇐⇒ R− C = ∆εR (1− α)
(
1− e−λT )
⇐⇒ C (T ) = R [1−∆ε (1− α)] + ∆εR (1− α) e−λT
= R
(
α+ (1− α) [(1−∆ε) + ∆εe−λT ]) ,
which is strictly less than R for T > 0. TC , the time at which the IR constraint becomes binding, is given by
0 ≤ TC (T ) = 1
λ
log
[
R (1− α)
C (T )− αR
]
= − 1
λ
log
[
(1−∆ε) + ∆εe−λT
] ≤ T,
with equality only for ∆ε = 1. This implies that the IC constraint is binding on [0, TC (T )] and the IR
constraint is binding on [TC (T ) , T ].
Note that by C ′ (T ) = −λR (1− α) ∆εe−λT < 0 and T ′C (T ) = ∆εe
−λT
(1−∆ε)+∆εe−λT > 0, the higher the
(arbitrary) funding cut-off T , the lower starting face value DT (0) and the later the IR constraint becomes
binding.
We establish the following auxiliary result on the maximized profit function Π (T ):
Lemma 3. Any point Textremal such that Π′ (Textremal) = 0 is a minimum of Π (T ), so that the slope of Π (T )
never changes from positive to negative. Thus, the maximum of Π (T ) on
[
0, T
]
occurs at the boundaries
T ∈ {0, T}.
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Proof of Lemma 3. Plugging in, we have
Π (T ) = 1
T
ˆ TC(T )
0
[C (T )− 1] dt+ 1
T
ˆ T
TC(T )
([
α+ (1− α) e−λt]R− 1) dt
+T − T
T
(
∆ε
[
α+ (1− α) e−λT ]R− 1 + ε)
= TC (T )
T
[
R
(
α+ (1− α) [(1−∆ε) + ∆εe−λT ])− 1]+ T − TC (T )
T
(αR− 1)
+ 1
T
(1− α)R
[
e−λTC(T ) − e−λT
λ
]
+ T − T
T
(
∆ε
[
α+ (1− α) e−λT ]R− 1 + ε)
= TC (T )
T
(1− α) [(1−∆ε) + ∆εe−λT ]R+ T
T
(αR− 1)
+ 1
T
(1− α)R
[[
(1−∆ε) + ∆εe−λT
]− e−λT
λ
]
+ T − T
T
(
∆ε
[
α+ (1− α) e−λT ]R− 1 + ε)
= TC (T )
T
(1− α) [(1−∆ε) + ∆εe−λT ]R+ T
T
(αR− 1)
+ 1
T
(1− α)R (1−∆ε)
(
1− e−λT )
λ
+ T − T
T
(
∆ε
[
α+ (1− α) e−λT ]R− 1 + ε) ,
with
Π (0) = ∆εR− 1.
Now take the derivative of Π (T ) with respect to T , where TC (T ) and C (T ) are given in the proof of
Lemma 2. This yields
Π′ (T ) = 1
T
ˆ TC
0
dt · C ′ (T ) + 1
T
{
(1−∆ε)
[
α+ (1− α) e−λT ]R}
−λT − T
T
∆ε (1− α) e−λTR− ε
T
= TC (T )
T
R (1− α) (−λ) ∆εe−λT + 1
T
(1−∆ε)αR
+ 1
T
(1− α) e−λTR [(1−∆ε)− λ∆ε (T − T )]− ε
T
= 1
T
(1−∆ε)αR+ 1
T
(1− α) e−λTR{(1−∆ε)− λ∆ε (T − [T − TC (T )])}− ε
T
.
Note that Π′ (0) = 1
T
[
(1−∆ε)− (1− α) ∆ελT
]
R− ε
T
. Further, note that
T > [T − TC (T )] = 1
λ
log
[
1
e−λT
]
− TC (T ) = 1
λ
log
[
(1−∆ε) eλT + ∆ε
]
> 0.
Taking the second derivative of Π (T ) with respect to T , and plugging in T − CC (T ) from above, we have
Π′′ (T ) = −λ 1
T
(1− α) e−λTR{(1−∆ε)− λ∆ε (T − [T − TC (T )])}
+ 1
T
(1− α) e−λTR{λ∆ε [T − TC (T )]′}+ λε
T
− λε
T
= −λΠ′ (T ) + λ 1
T
[(1−∆ε)αR− ε] + 1
T
(1− α) e−λTR{λ∆ε [T − TC (T )]′} .
Since [T − TC (T )]′ = (1−∆ε)(1−∆ε)+∆εe−λT > 0, for small enough ε (e.g., for
(1−∆)αR
1−∆αR > ε), the second and third
terms are positive. Thus, if there exists a Textremal such that Π′ (Textremal) = 0, then we have Π′′ (Textremal) >
45
0. This implies that if ever Π′ (t) > 0 for t ≥ 0, then Π′ (t′) > 0, t′ > t. In words, if the slope of the profit
function ever turns positive, it remains positive thereafter. If Π′ (0) > 0, then Π (T ) is monotonically
increasing in T , and either no funding is offered or all maturities are funded. If in addition Π (0) > 0, then
funding is provided up to T . If Π′ (0) < 0, then there is a possibility that Π′ (T ) switches sign once to
positive, and if an extremal point Π′ (Textremal) = 0 exists, it is a minimum. Thus, the maximum profit
arises either from Π (0) or Π
(
T
)
. The only interesting situation in comparing the monopolist and a central
planner arises when Π (0) > 0 > Π′ (0) and there exists a point Tcp such that Π (Tcp) = 0 > Π′ (Tcp). Finally,
for completeness, we note that
Π
(
T
)
=
α+ (1− α)
TC (T )
T
(1−∆ε) + ∆ε
TC
(
T
)
T
e−λT +
(1−∆ε)
(
1− e−λT
)
λT
R− 1.
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